



Brussels, 18 December 2015  
(OR. en)

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**Interinstitutional File:  
2013/0027 (COD)**

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15229/2/15  
REV 2

**TELECOM 232  
DATAPROTECT 235  
CYBER 127  
MI 795  
CSC 311  
CODEC 1707**

**NOTE**

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From:	Presidency
To:	Permanent Representatives Committee
No. Cion doc.:	6342/13 TELECOM 24 DATAPROTECT 14 CYBER 2 MI 104 CODEC 313
Subject:	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union - Examination of the final compromise text in view to agreement

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1. With a view to the Coreper meeting of 18 December 2015, delegations will find in Annex the compromise text of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union. For the ease of reference, the changes made in the operative part of the proposal, as compared to the Coreper mandate (doc. 14606/2/15 REV1 COR1), are marked in bold/strikethrough. Due to lack of time, recitals are presented in a clean text.
2. Certain additional changes have been introduced in the operative part in the revised version of this document:
  - in article 2 it has been clarified that minimum harmonisation does not apply to article 15a(1b).

- the deadline for identification of operators has been included in art 3a(1) instead of art 21(3a), which has been deleted.
  - a linguistic correction has been made in art. 6(5).
  - in art. 8a(3)(h) the word 'institutions' has been introduced.
  - art. 8a(5) has been aligned with the other provisions on implementing acts.
  - the text on parameters listed in art. 15a(2)(d) and (e) has been slightly improved.
  - in art. 15a(5) it has been clarified that the whole Chapter does not apply to micro and small enterprises.
  - the period in art. 20a(1a) has been aligned with the deadline for the identification of operators in article 3a(1).
3. The final text of recitals has been included. Delegations will find three sections of recitals:
- amended recitals coming from the original Commission proposal,
  - recitals coming from either the Council or European Parliament's text as amended during the negotiations,
  - recitals agreed at the trilogue.

Delegations are invited to note, that there is still an open issue with regards to the inclusion of the 3<sup>rd</sup> recital relating to Annex II.4 (page 18), as the EP and the Commission consider that payment and settlement systems are not in the scope of this Directive.

The recitals will be put in correct order at a later stage, during the lawyer-linguist revision.

Proposal for a

**DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL**

**concerning measures ~~with a view to achieving~~ for a high common level of security of network and information security systems across the Union**

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national Parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee<sup>1</sup>,

After consulting the European Data Protection Supervisor,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C [...], [...], p. [...].

## **I. Amended recitals from the original Commission proposal:**

- (1) Network and information systems and services play a vital role in the society. Their reliability and security are essential to economic and societal activities, and in particular to the functioning of the internal market.
- (2) The magnitude, frequency and impact of security incidents is increasing and represents a major threat to the functioning of networks and information systems. Those systems may also become a target for deliberate harmful actions intended to damage or interrupt the operation of the systems. Such incidents can impede the pursuit of economic activities, generate substantial financial losses, undermine user confidence and cause major damage to the economy of the Union
- (3) Network and information systems, and primarily the Internet, play an essential role in facilitating the cross-border movement of goods, services and people. Due to that transnational nature, substantial disruption of those systems, whether intentional or unintentional and regardless of where they occur, can affect individual Member States and the Union as a whole. The security of network and information systems is therefore essential to the smooth functioning of the internal market.
- (4) Building upon the significant progress within the European Forum of Member States ('EFMS') in fostering discussions and exchanges on good policy practices including the development of principles for European cyber crisis cooperation, a cooperation group should be established composed of Member States' representatives, the Commission and ENISA to support and facilitate strategic cooperation between the Member States regarding network and information security ('NIS'). For that group to be effective and inclusive, it is essential that all Member States have minimum capabilities and a strategy ensuring a high level of NIS in their territory. In addition, security and incident notification requirements should apply to operators of essential services and to digital service providers to promote a culture of risk management and ensure that the most serious incidents are reported.
- (5) To cover all relevant incidents and risks, this Directive should apply to both operators of essential services and digital service providers. The obligations on operators of essential services and digital service providers should however not apply to undertakings providing public communication networks or publicly available electronic communication services within the meaning of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive)<sup>2</sup>, which are subject to the specific security and integrity requirements laid down in Article 13a of that Directive nor should they apply to trust service providers within the meaning of Regulation 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, which are subject to the requirements laid down in Article 19 of that Regulation.

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<sup>2</sup> OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33.

- (6) The existing capabilities are not sufficient to ensure a high level of NIS within the Union. Member States have very different levels of preparedness leading to fragmented approaches across the Union. This leads to an unequal level of protection of consumers and businesses, and undermines the overall level of NIS within the Union. Lack of common requirements on operators of essential services and digital service providers in turn makes it impossible to set up a global and effective mechanism for cooperation at Union level. Universities and research centres have a decisive role in spurring research, development and innovation in those areas.
- (7) Responding effectively to the challenges of the security of network and information systems therefore requires a global approach at Union level covering common minimum capacity building and planning requirements, exchange of information, cooperation and common security requirements for operators of essential services and digital service providers.
- (8) The provisions of this Directive should be without prejudice to the possibility for each Member State to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of its essential security interests, to safeguard public policy and public security, and to permit the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. In accordance with Article 346 TFEU, no Member State is to be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security. In this context, Council Decision of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (2011/292/EU), non-disclosure agreements or informal non-disclosure agreements, such as the Traffic Light Protocol, are of relevance.
- (9) To achieve and maintain a common high level of security of network and information systems, each Member State should have a national NIS strategy defining the strategic objectives and concrete policy actions to be implemented.
- (10) To allow for the effective implementation of the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive, a body responsible for coordinating NIS issues and acting as a single point of contact for cross-border cooperation at Union level should be established or identified in each Member State. The competent authorities and the single point of contact should be given the adequate technical, financial and human resources to ensure that they can carry out in an effective and efficient manner the tasks assigned to them and thus achieve the objectives of this Directive. As this Directive aims at improving the functioning of the internal market by creating trust and confidence, Member State bodies need to be able to cooperate effectively with economic actors and to be structured accordingly.

- (10a) In view of the differences in national governance structures and in order to safeguard already existing sectoral arrangements or Union supervisory and regulatory bodies, and to avoid duplication, Member States should be able to designate more than one national competent authority responsible for fulfilling the tasks linked to the security of the networks and information systems of operators of essential services and digital service providers under this Directive. However, in order to facilitate cross-border cooperation and communication, it is necessary for each Member State, without prejudice to sectoral regulatory arrangements, to designate a national single point of contact in charge of cross-border cooperation at Union level.
- (11) All Member States should be adequately equipped, both in terms of technical and organisational capabilities, to prevent, detect, respond to and mitigate network and information systems' incidents and risks. All Member States should therefore ensure they have well-functioning Computer Security Incident Response Teams ("CSIRTs"), also known as Computer Emergency Response Teams ("CERTs"), complying with essential requirements to guarantee effective and compatible capabilities to deal with incidents and risks and ensure efficient cooperation at Union level. In order for all types of operators of essential services and digital service providers to benefit from such capabilities and cooperation, Member States should ensure that all types are covered by a designated CSIRT. Given the importance of international cooperation on cybersecurity, CSIRTs should have the possibility to participate in international cooperation networks in addition to the CSIRTs network established by this Directive.
- ~~(12) Building upon the significant progress within the European Forum of Member States ("EFMS") in fostering discussions and exchanges on good policy practices including the development of principles for European cyber crisis cooperation, the Member States and the Commission should form a network to bring them into permanent communication and support their cooperation. This secure and effective cooperation mechanism should enable structured and coordinated information exchange, detection and response at Union level.~~
- (13) The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security ('ENISA') should assist the Member States and the Commission by providing its expertise and advice and by facilitating exchange of best practices. In particular, in the application of this Directive, the Commission should and Member States could consult ENISA. To ensure effective information to the Member States and the Commission, a summary report on notification should be submitted to the cooperation group. To build capacity and knowledge among Member States, the cooperation group should also serve as an instrument for the exchange of best practices, discussion of capabilities and preparedness of the Member States and on a voluntary basis assisting its members in evaluating national NIS strategies, building capacity and NIS exercises.

- (13a) Where appropriate, Member States should be able to use or adapt existing organisational structures or strategies when applying the provisions of this Directive.
- ~~(14) A secure information-sharing infrastructure should be put in place to allow for the exchange of sensitive and confidential information within the cooperation network. Without prejudice to their obligation to notify incidents and risks of Union dimension to the cooperation network, access to confidential information from other Member States should only be granted to Member States upon demonstration that their technical, financial and human resources and processes, as well as their communication infrastructure, guarantee their effective, efficient and secure participation in the network.~~
- (15) As most network and information systems are privately operated, cooperation between the public and private sector is essential. Operators of essential services and digital service providers should be encouraged to pursue their own informal cooperation mechanisms to ensure NIS. The cooperation group should be able to invite relevant stakeholders to the discussions where appropriate. To effectively encourage the sharing of information and of best practices, it is essential to ensure that operators of essential services and digital service providers who participate in such exchanges are not disadvantaged as a result of their cooperation.
- (16) Information about NIS incidents is increasingly valuable to the general public and businesses, particularly small and medium-sized businesses. In some cases, such information is already provided via websites at the national level, in the language of a specific country and focusing mainly on incidents and occurrences with a national dimension. Given that businesses increasingly operate cross-border and citizens use online services, information on incidents should be provided in an aggregated form at EU level. The secretariat of the CSIRT network is encouraged to maintain a website or host a dedicated page on an existing website where general information on major NIS incidents occurring across the Union is put at the disposal of the general public, with a specific focus on the interests and needs of businesses. CSIRTs participating in the CSIRTs network are encouraged to provide on a voluntary basis the information to be published in this website. Such a website is not supposed to include confidential or sensitive information.
- (17) Where information is considered confidential in accordance with Union and national rules on business confidentiality, such confidentiality should be ensured when carrying out the activities and fulfilling the objectives set by this Directive.
- ~~(18) On the basis in particular of national crisis management experiences and in cooperation with ENISA, the Commission and the Member States should develop a Union NIS cooperation plan defining cooperation mechanisms to counter risks and incidents. That plan should be duly taken into account in the operation of early warnings within the cooperation network.~~

- ~~(19) Notification of an early warning within the network should be required only where the scale and severity of the incident or risk concerned are or may become so significant that information or coordination of the response at Union level is necessary. Early warnings should therefore be limited to actual or potential incidents or risks that grow rapidly, exceed national response capacity or affect more than one Member State. To allow for a proper evaluation, all information relevant for the assessment of the risk or incident should be communicated to the cooperation network.~~
- ~~(20) Upon receipt of an early warning and its assessment, the competent authorities should agree on a coordinated response under the Union NIS cooperation plan. Competent authorities as well as the Commission should be informed about the measures adopted at national level as a result of the coordinated response.~~
- (21) Given the global nature of NIS problems, there is a need for closer international cooperation to improve security standards and information exchange, and promote a common global approach to NIS issues.
- (22) Responsibilities in ensuring NIS lie to a great extent on operators of essential services and digital service providers. A culture of risk management-involving risk assessment and the implementation of security measures appropriate to the risks faced, should be promoted and developed through appropriate regulatory requirements and voluntary industry practices. Establishing a trustworthy level playing field is also essential to the effective functioning of the cooperation group and CSIRTs network to ensure effective cooperation from all Member States.
- ~~(23) Directive 2002/21/EC requires that undertakings providing public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate measures to safeguard their integrity and security and introduces security breach and integrity loss notification requirements. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)<sup>3</sup> requires a provider of a publicly available electronic communications service to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard the security of its services.~~

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<sup>3</sup> OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37.



- ~~(24) Those obligations should be extended beyond the electronic communications sector to key providers of information society services, as defined in Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services<sup>4</sup>, which underpin downstream information society services or on-line activities, such as e-commerce platforms, Internet payment gateways, social networks, search engines, cloud computing services, application stores. Disruption of these enabling information society services prevents the provision of other information society services which rely on them as key inputs. Software developers and hardware manufacturers are not providers of information society services and are therefore excluded. Those obligations should also be extended to public administrations, and operators of critical infrastructure which rely heavily on information and communications technology and are essential to the maintenance of vital economical or societal functions such as electricity and gas, transport, credit institutions, stock exchange and health. Disruption of those network and information systems would affect the internal market.~~
- (24a) While hardware manufacturers and software developers are not operators of essential services or digital service providers comparable to those covered in this Directive, their products facilitate the security of network and information systems. They therefore have an important role in enabling operators of essential services and digital service providers to secure their network and information infrastructures. Such hardware and software products are already subject to existing rules on product liability.
- (25) Technical and organisational measures imposed on operators of essential services and digital service providers should not require that a particular commercial information and communications technology product be designed, developed or manufactured in a particular manner.
- (26) The operators of essential services and digital service providers should ensure security of the networks and systems which they use. These would be primarily private networks and systems managed either by their internal IT staff or the security of which has been outsourced. The security and notification obligations should apply to the relevant operators of essential services and digital service providers regardless of whether they perform the maintenance of their network and information systems internally or outsource it.
- (27) To avoid imposing a disproportionate financial and administrative burden on operators of essential services and digital service providers, the requirements should be proportionate to the risk presented by the network or information system concerned, taking into account the state of the art of such measures. In the case of digital service providers, these requirements should not apply to micro enterprises and small enterprises.

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<sup>4</sup> OJ L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 37.

- (28) Competent authorities should pay due attention to preserving informal and trusted channels of information-sharing. Publicity of incidents reported to the competent authorities should duly balance the interest of the public in being informed about threats with possible reputational and commercial damages for the operators of essential services and digital service providers reporting incidents. In the implementation of the notification obligations, competent authorities and CSIRTs should pay particular attention to the need to maintain information about product vulnerabilities strictly confidential prior to the release of appropriate security fixes.
- (29) Competent authorities should have the necessary means to perform their duties, including powers to obtain sufficient information in order to assess the level of security of network and information systems.
- (30) Incidents may be the result of criminal activities, the prevention, investigation and prosecution of which is supported by coordination and cooperation between operators of essential services, digital service providers, competent authorities and law enforcement authorities. Where an incident is suspected to be related to serious criminal activities under national or European law, Member States should encourage operators of essential services and digital service providers to themselves report incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature to the relevant law enforcement authorities. Where appropriate, it is desirable that coordination between competent authorities and law enforcement authorities of different Member States be facilitated by the Europol Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and the European Union Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA).
- (31) Personal data are in many cases compromised as a result of incidents. In this context, competent authorities and data protection authorities should cooperate and exchange information on all relevant matters to tackle the personal data breaches resulting from incidents.
- (32) Standardisation of security requirements is a market-driven process. To ensure a convergent application of security standards, Member States should encourage compliance or conformity with specified standards to ensure a high level of security at Union level. ENISA should assist Member States through advice and guidelines. To this end it might be helpful to draft harmonised standards, which should be done in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

- (33) The Commission should periodically review this Directive, in consultation with all interested stakeholders, in particular with a view to determining the need for modification in the light of changing societal, political, technological or market conditions.
- ~~(34) In order to allow for the proper functioning of the cooperation network, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the definition of the criteria to be fulfilled for a Member State to be authorized to participate to the secure information-sharing system, of the further specification of the triggering events for early warning, and of the definition of the circumstances in which market operators and public administrations are required to notify incidents.~~
- ~~(35) It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.~~
- (36) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to specify the procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning of the cooperation group and the security and notification requirements applicable to digital service providers. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers. When adopting implementing acts related to the security and notification requirements for digital service providers, the Commission should take utmost account of the opinion of ENISA and should consult interested stakeholders.
- (37) In the application of this Directive, the Commission should liaise as appropriate with relevant sectoral committees and relevant bodies set up at Union level in the fields covered by this.
- ~~(38) Information that is considered confidential by a competent authority, in accordance with Union and national rules on business confidentiality, should be exchanged with the Commission and other competent authorities only where such exchange is strictly necessary for the application of this Directive. The information exchanged should be limited to that which is relevant and proportionate to the purpose of such exchange.~~

- (39) The sharing of information on risks and incidents within the cooperation group and CSIRTs network and compliance with the requirements to notify incidents to the national competent authorities or CSIRTs may require the processing of personal data. Such a processing of personal data should comply with Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. In the application of this Directive, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents should apply as appropriate.
- (40) Since the objectives of this Directive, aiming to achieve a high level of NIS in the Union, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States alone and can therefore, by reason of the effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
- (41) This Directive respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles, recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union notably, the right to respect for private life and communications, the protection for personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy before a court and the right to be heard. This Directive must be implemented according to these rights and principles

## **II. Recitals coming from either the Council or European Parliament's text as amended during the negotiations**

### **Linked to article 1(7)**

- (x) Certain sectors of the economy are already regulated or may be regulated in the future by sector-specific Union legal acts that include rules related to the security of networks and information systems. Whenever those Union legal acts contain provisions imposing requirements concerning the security of networks and information systems or notifications of incidents, these provisions should apply instead of the corresponding provisions of this Directive if they contain requirements which are at least equivalent in effect to the obligations contained in this Directive.
- (x) Member States should then apply the provisions of such sector-specific Union legal act, including those relating to jurisdiction, and should not carry out the identification process for operators of essential services as defined by this Directive. In this context, Member States should provide information to the Commission on the application of the provision on *lex specialis*.

### **Linked to article 1b**

- (x) Entities falling outside the scope of this Directive, may experience incidents having a significant impact on the services they provide. Where those entities consider that it is in the public interest to notify the relevant authorities of Member States of the occurrence of such incidents, they should be able to do so on a voluntary basis. Such notifications should be processed by those bodies where such processing does not constitute a disproportionate or undue burden on the Member States concerned.

### **Linked to articles 3(11e)**

- (x) An online marketplace should allow consumers and/or traders to conclude online sales and service contracts with traders, and should be the final destination for the conclusion of those contracts. It should not cover online services that serve only as an intermediary to third-party services where a contract can ultimately be concluded. It should therefore not cover online services that compare the price of particular products or services from different traders, and then redirect the user to the preferred trader to purchase the product. Computing services provided by the online marketplace may include processing of transactions, aggregations of data or profiling of users. Application stores, which operate as online stores enabling the digital distribution of applications or software programmes from third parties, is are to be understood as being a type of online marketplace.

### **Linked to article 3(11g)**

- (x) An online search engine should allow the user to perform searches of in principle all websites on the basis of a query on any subject. It may alternatively be focused on websites in a particular language. The definition of an online search engine provided in this Directive should not cover search functions that are limited to the content of a specific website, irrespective of whether the search function is provided by an external search engine. It should also not cover online services that compare the price of particular products or services from different traders, and then redirect the user to the preferred trader to purchase the product.

### **Linked to article 3(11j)**

- (x) Cloud computing services span a wide range of activities that can be delivered according to different models. For the purposes of this Directive, "cloud computing services" means services that enable access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources. The term "computing resources" covers resources such as networks, servers or other infrastructure, storage, applications and services. "Scalable" means that, in order to handle fluctuations in demand, computing resources are flexibly allocated by the cloud service provider irrespective of the geographical location of the resources. "Elastic pool" means that these computing resources, in order to rapidly increase and decrease resources available in accordance with workload, are provisioned and released according to demand. "Shareable" means that these computing resources are provided to multiple users who share a common access to the service, but where the processing is carried out separately for each user, although the service is provided from the same electronic equipment.

### **Linked to article 3(11)**

- (x) The function of an IXP is to interconnect networks. An IXP does not provide network access or act as a transit provider or carrier. An IXP also does not provide other services unrelated to interconnection (although this does not preclude an IXP operator from also providing unrelated services). An IXP exists to interconnect networks that are technically and organisationally separate. The term autonomous system is used to describe a technically stand-alone network.

### **Linked to article 3a**

- (x) Member States should be responsible for determining which entities meet the criteria of the definition of operator of essential services as part of the transposition- of the Directive into national law. In order to ensure a consistent approach, the definition of operator of essential services should be coherently applied by all Member States. For this purpose the Directive provides for the assessment of the entities active in the subsectors, or in the sector where no subsector is listed in Annex II, the establishment of a list of essential services, the consideration of a common list of cross-sectoral factors to determine whether a potential incident would have a significant disruptive effect, a consultation process involving relevant Member States in case of entities providing services in more than one Member State, and the support of the Cooperation Group in the identification process. In order to ensure that possible changes in the market are accurately reflected, the list of identified operators should be reviewed regularly by Member States and updated when necessary. Finally Member States should submit to the Commission the information necessary to assess the extent to which this common methodology allowed a consistent application of the definition by Member States.

### **Linked to article 3a(1)**

- (x) In the process of identification of operators of essential services, Member States should assess, at least for each subsector referred to in this Directive, which services have to be considered as essential for the maintenance of critical societal and economic activities and assess whether the entities listed in the sectors and subsectors in this Directive and providing those services meet the criteria for the identification of operators. When assessing whether an entity provides a service which is essential for the maintenance of critical societal or economic activities, it is sufficient to examine whether a specific entity provides an essential service that is included in the list of services. Furthermore, it should be demonstrated that provision of the essential service is dependent on network and information systems. Finally, when assessing whether an incident to the network and information systems of the service would have significant disruptive effect on its provision, Member States should take into account a number of cross-sectoral factors. They should also take into account sector-specific factors where appropriate.

### **Linked to article 3a(2)**

- (x) Entities in the sectors and subsectors listed in Annex II may provide essential and non-essential services. For example, in the air transport sector, airports may provide services, which might be considered by a Member State as essential, such as the management of the runways, but also a number of services which might be considered as non-essential, such as the provision of shopping areas. Operators of essential services should be subject to the specific security obligations only with respect to those services which are deemed essential. For the purpose of identifying operators, Member States should therefore establish a list of the services which are considered as essential.
- (x) The list of services should serve as a reference point for the competent national authorities allowing for identification of operators of essential services. Its purpose is to identify the types of essential services in any given sector listed in Annex II, thus distinguishing them from non-essential activities that an entity active in any given sector may be responsible for. The list of services should contain all services provided in the territory of the Member State that fulfil the requirements under this Directive: The Member State should be able to include new services to the existing list if such emerge in the future. The list of services established by each Member State would serve as further input in the assessment of the regulatory practice of each Member State with a view to ensuring the overall level of consistency of the identification process amongst Member States.

### **Linked to article 3a(3)**

- (x) For the purposes of the identification process, where a potential operator provides the essential service in two or more Member States, those Member States should engage in bilateral or multilateral discussions with each other. This consultation process is intended to help Member States to assess the criticality of the operator in terms of cross-border impact and allows each Member State involved to present its views regarding the risks associated to the services provided by the operator. In this process Member States concerned should take into account each other's views. The Member States concerned may request the assistance of the Cooperation Group in this regard.

### **Linked to article 3a(6)(a)**

- (x) As a result of the identification process Member States should adopt national measures which will determine which entities are subject to NIS obligations. This result could be achieved by adopting a list enumerating all operators of essential services or by adopting national measures including objective quantifiable criteria (e.g. output of the operator or number of users) which would allow to determine which entities are subject to NIS obligations and which are not. The national measures should include all legal measures, administrative measures and policies allowing for the identification of operators of essential services under this Directive, whether already existing or adopted in the context of this Directive.

**Linked to article 3a(6)(c)**

- (x) In order to give an indication of the importance of the identified operators in relation to the sector concerned, Member States should take into account the number and the size of identified operators, for example in terms of market share or of the quantity produced or carried, without being obliged to divulge information which would reveal which operators have been identified.

**Linked to article 3b(1)(a)**

- (x) For the purpose of determining the significance of a disruptive effect of an incident on an essential service, Member States should take into account the number of natural persons **and** legal entities using that service for private or professional purposes. The use of that service can be direct, indirect or by intermediation.

**Linked to article 3b(1)(c)**

- (x) In order to determine whether an incident would have a significant disruptive effect on the provision of a service, Member States should take into account a number of different factors. When assessing the impact an incident could have, in terms of its degree and duration, on economic and societal activities or public safety, Member States should also assess the time likely to elapse before the discontinuity would start to have a negative impact.

**Linked to article 3b(2)**

- (x) In order to determine whether an incident would have a significant disruptive effect on the provision of a service, in addition to the cross-sectorial factors, sector specific factors should also be considered. With regard to energy suppliers such factors could include the volume or proportion of national power generated; for oil suppliers the volume per day; for air transport (including airports and air carriers), rail transport and maritime ports the proportion of national traffic volume and the number of passengers or cargo operations per year; for banking/financial market infrastructures their systemic importance based on total assets or the ratio of those total assets to GDP; for health, the number of patients under the provider's care per year; for water production, processing and supply the volume and number and types of users supplied (including for instance hospitals, public service, organisations or individuals), and the existence of alternative sources of water to cover the same geographical area.



#### **Linked to article 6(4)**

- (x) Competent authorities or CSIRTs should receive the notifications of incidents. The single points of contact should not receive directly any notifications of incidents unless they also act as a competent authority or CSIRT. A competent authority or CSIRT might however task the single point of contact to forward incident notifications to the single points of contact of other affected Member States.

#### **Linked to article 6(4ab new)**

- (x) The summary report submitted by the single point of contact to the cooperation group should be anonymised in order to preserve the confidentiality of the notifications and the identity of operators of essential services and DSPs as information on the identity of the notifying entities is not required for the exchange of best practices in the cooperation group. The summary report should include information on the number of notifications received, as well as an indication on the nature of the notified incidents, such as the types of security breaches, their seriousness or their duration.

#### **Linked to article 8a(3)(c)**

- (x) The respective tasks of the Cooperation Group and the European Network and Information Security Agency ("ENISA") are interdependent and complementary. In general, ENISA should assist the Cooperation Group established under Article 8a in the execution of its tasks, in line with the objective of ENISA set out in Article 2 of Regulation 526/2013 to "[...] assist the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the Member States in implementing the policies necessary to meet the legal and regulatory requirements of network and information security under existing and future legal acts of the Union [...]". In particular, ENISA should provide assistance in those areas that correspond to its own tasks, as set out in Article 3 of Regulation 526/2013, i.e. analysing NIS strategies, supporting the organisation and running of Union NIS exercises, and exchanging information and best practice on awareness-raising and training. ENISA should also be involved in the development of guidelines for sector-specific criteria for determining the significance of the impact of an incident.

#### **Linked to article 8a(3)(h)**

- (x) In order to promote advanced network and information security, the cooperation group should, where appropriate, cooperate with relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, to exchange know-how and best practices and to provide advice on NIS aspects that might have an impact on their work, while respecting existing arrangements for the exchange of restricted information. In cooperating with law enforcement bodies regarding network and information security aspects that might have an impact on their work, the cooperation group should respect existing channels of information and established networks.

- (x) Cybersecurity exercises, which simulate real time incident scenarios, are essential for testing Member States' preparedness and cooperation. The CyberEurope cycle of exercises coordinated by ENISA with the participation of the Member States is a useful tool for testing and drawing up recommendations on how incident response at EU level should improve over time. Considering that, at present, the Member States are not under an obligation to either plan or participate in exercises, the creation of the CSIRTs network under this Directive should enable the Member States to participate in exercises on the basis of accurate planning and strategic choices. The Cooperation group set up under this Directive should deal with the strategic decisions regarding exercises, in particular but not exclusively as regards the regularity of the exercises and the design of the scenarios. ENISA should, in accordance with its mandate support the organisation and running of Union-wide exercises by providing its expertise and advice to the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network.

**Linked to article 14**

- (x) This Directive only applies to public administrations of the type listed in Annex II and identified as operators of essential services. It is the responsibility of Member States to ensure the security of network and information systems of public administrations not falling within the scope of this Directive.

**Linked to article 14(1)**

- (x) Measures to manage the risk include measures to identify any risks of incidents, to prevent, detect and handle incidents and to mitigate their impact; the security of network and information systems comprises the security of stored, transmitted and processed data.

**Linked to article 15a**

- (x) Many EU businesses rely on Digital Service Providers (DSPs) as defined in this Directive for the provision of their own services. As some digital services can be an important resource for their users, including operators of essential services, and as such users may not always have alternatives available, this Directive should also apply to providers of such services. The security, continuity and reliability of the type of services referred to in Annex III is of the essence for the smooth functioning of many businesses. A disruption of a digital service as listed in Annex III could prevent the provision of other services which rely on it and could thus have an impact on key economic and societal activities in the Union. Such digital services may therefore be of crucial importance for the smooth functioning of businesses that depend on them and moreover for the participation of such businesses in the internal market and cross-border trade across the Union. The DSPs included in this Directive are those considered to offer digital services on which many EU businesses increasingly rely.

### **Linked to article 15a(1)**

- (x) DSPs should ensure a level of security commensurate to the degree of risk posed to the security of the services they provide, given the importance of their services to the operations of other businesses within the EU. In practice the degree of risk for operators of essential services, which are often essential for the maintenance of critical societal and economic activities, will be higher than for DSPs. Therefore the security requirements for DSPs should be lighter. DSPs should remain free to take measures they consider appropriate to manage the risks posed to the security of their networks and information systems. Because of their cross-border nature, DSPs should be subject to a more harmonised approach at the European level. Implementing acts should facilitate the specification and implementation of such measures.

### **Linked to article 15b(1)**

- (x) DSPs should be subject to light-touch and reactive ex post supervisory activities justified by the nature of their services and operations. The competent authority should therefore only take action when provided with evidence (for example by the DSP itself, by another competent authority, including a competent authority of another Member State, or by a user of the service) that a DSP does not comply with the requirements of this Directive, in particular following an incident that has occurred. The competent authority should therefore have no general obligation to supervise DSPs.

### **Linked to article 15c/d**

- (x) Jurisdiction for digital service providers should be attributed to only one Member State, where the operator has its main establishment in the Union, which in principle corresponds to the place where the provider has its head office in the Union. Establishment implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements. The legal form of such arrangements, whether through a branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in this respect. This criterion should not depend on whether the network and information systems are physically located in that place; the presence and use of such systems do not, in themselves, constitute such main establishment and are therefore not criteria for determining the main establishment.

### **Linked to article 15c/d(2)**

- (x) Where a digital service provider not established in the Union offers services within the Union, it should designate a representative. In order to determine whether such a digital service provider is offering services within the Union, it should be ascertained whether it is apparent that the digital service provider is envisaging the offering of services to persons in one or more Member States in the Union. Whereas the mere accessibility of the digital service provider's or an intermediary's website in the Union or of an email address and of other contact details or the use of a language generally used in the third country where the digital service provider is established, is insufficient to ascertain such intention, factors such as the use of a language or a currency generally used in one or more Member States with the possibility of ordering services in that other language, and/or the mentioning of customers or users who are in the Union, may make it apparent that the digital service provider envisages offering services within the Union. The representative should act on behalf of the digital service provider and competent authorities or CSIRTs may contact the representative. The representative should be explicitly designated by a written mandate of the digital service provider to act on his behalf with regard to the latter's obligations, including incident reporting, under this Directive.

### **Linked to Annex II, 2(c)**

- (x) When identifying operators in the maritime sector, Member States should take into account existing and future international codes and guidelines developed in particular by the International Maritime Organisation, with a view to providing individual maritime operators with a coherent approach.
- (x) In the water transport sector, security requirements for companies, ships, port facilities, ports and vessel traffic systems, under Union legal acts cover all operations including the radio and telecommunication systems, computer systems and networks. Part of the mandatory procedures to be followed includes the reporting of all security incidents and should therefore be considered as *lex specialis*, insofar as those requirements are at least equivalent to the corresponding provisions of this Directive.

### **Linked to Annex II, 4**

- (x) Regulation and supervision in the sectors of banking and financial market infrastructures is highly harmonised at EU level, through the use of primary and secondary EU legislation and standards developed together with the European Supervisory Authorities. Within the Banking Union, the application and supervision of these requirements is assured by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). For Member States that do not form part of the Banking Union this is assured by the relevant banking regulators for Member States. In other areas of financial sector regulation, the European System of Financial Supervision also assures a high degree of commonality and convergence in supervisory practices. The European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) also has a direct supervision role for certain entities (i.e. credit rating agencies and trade repositories).

- (x) Operational risk is a crucial part of prudential regulation and supervision in the sectors of banking and financial market infrastructures. It covers all operations including the security, integrity and resilience of network and information systems. The requirements for these systems, which often exceed the requirements provided for under this Directive, are set out in a number of Union legal acts, including but not limited to rules on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (CRD IV) and rules on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR), which include requirements on operational risk; rules on markets in financial instruments (MiFID II), which include requirements on risk assessment for investment firms and for regulated markets; rules on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, which include requirements on operational risk for central counterparties and trade repositories; and rules on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories, which include requirements on operational risk. Furthermore, requirements for notification of incidents are part of normal supervisory practice in the financial sector and are often included in supervisory manuals. Member States should consider the foregoing in their application of *lex specialis*.
- (x) As noted by the ECB in its opinion of 25 July 2014 on the NIS proposal, this Directive ~~should be without prejudice to~~ **does not affect** the regime under Union law for the Eurosystem's oversight of payment and settlement systems, ~~insofar as it includes inter alia, requirements in the area of NIS that are at least equivalent in effect to the obligations contained in this Directive.~~ It would be appropriate for the authorities responsible for such oversight to exchange experiences on matters concerning NIS with the competent authorities for this Directive. The same consideration applies to non-Eurosystem members of the ESCB exercising such oversight of payment and settlement systems on the basis of national laws and regulations.

### **III. Recitals agreed at the trilogue**

- (x) Operators of essential services and digital service providers are not precluded from implementing stricter security measures than provided for under this Directive.

#### **Linked to article 1(7)**

- (x) In determining whether the requirements on the security of networks and information systems and/or the notification of incidents contained in sector specific Union legal acts are equivalent to those contained in Articles 14 and 15a of this Directive, regard should only be had to the provisions of relevant Union legal acts and their application in the Member States.

#### **Linked to article 3a(1)**

- (x) For the purposes of identifying operators of essential services, establishment implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements. The legal form of such arrangements, whether through a branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in this respect.

### **Linked to article 14(6)**

- (x) Competent authorities should retain the ability to adopt national guidelines concerning the circumstances in which operators of essential services are required to notify incidents.

### **Linked to Chapter IVa**

- (x) Where public administrations in Member States use services offered by DSPs, in particular cloud computing services, they may wish to require additional security measures from the providers of such services beyond what DSPs would normally offer in compliance with the requirements of this Directive. They may do so by means of contractual obligations.
- (x) The definitions of online marketplaces, online search engines and cloud computing services in this Directive are for the specific purpose of this Directive, and without prejudice to any other instruments.
- (x) This Directive should not prevent Member States from adopting national measures obliging public sector bodies to ensure specific security requirements when they contract cloud computing services. Any such national measures should apply to the public sector body (the client) and not to the cloud computing service provider.
- (x) Given the fundamental differences between operators of essential services, in particular their direct link with physical infrastructure, and digital service providers, in particular their cross-border nature, this Directive should take a differentiated approach with respect to the level of harmonisation in relation to those two groups of entities. For operators of essential services, Member States should be able to identify the relevant operators and impose stricter requirements than those laid down in this Directive. Member States should not identify digital service providers, as this Directive should apply to all digital service providers within its scope. In addition, this Directive and the implementing acts adopted under it should ensure a high level of harmonisation for digital service providers with respect to security and notification requirements. These elements should allow for a uniform treatment of digital service providers across the Union, in a manner proportionate to their nature and degree of risk they may face.
- (x) This Directive should not prohibit Member States from imposing security and notification requirements on entities that are not digital service providers within the scope of this Directive, without prejudice to Member States' obligations under Union law.

### **Linked to article 15a(1)**

- (x) When adopting implementing acts on the security requirements for digital service providers, the Commission is encouraged to take into account the following examples: Relating to security of systems and facilities: physical and environmental security, security of supplies, access control to network and information systems and integrity of network and information systems; relating to incident management: incident management procedures, incident detection capability, incident reporting and communication; relating to business continuity management: service continuity strategy and contingency plans, disaster recovery capabilities; and relating to monitoring, auditing and testing: monitoring and logging policies, exercise contingency plans, network and information systems testing, security assessments and compliance monitoring.

### **Linked to implementing acts**

- (x) When adopting implementing acts related to the security and notification requirements for digital service providers, the Commission should take utmost account of the opinion of ENISA and should consult interested stakeholders.
- (x) When adopting implementing acts related to the procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning of the cooperation group, the Commission should take utmost account of the opinion of ENISA.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

**CHAPTER I**  
**GENERAL PROVISIONS**

*Article 1*

Subject matter and scope

1. This Directive lays down measures with a view to achieving a high common level of security of networks and information systems (hereinafter referred to as "NIS") within the Union so as to improve the functioning of the internal market.
2. To that end, this Directive:
  - (a) lays down obligations for all Member States to adopt a national NIS strategy;
  - (b) creates a cooperation group in order to support and facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information among Member States and develop trust and confidence amongst them;
  - (ba) creates a CSIRTs ("Computer Security Incident Response Team") network in order to contribute to developing confidence and trust between Member States and to promote swift and effective operational cooperation;
  - (c) establishes security and notification requirements for operators of essential services.
  - (ca) establishes security and notification requirements for digital service providers;
  - (d) lays down obligations for Member States to designate national competent authorities, single points of contact and CSIRTs with tasks related to the security of networks and information systems.
3. The security and notification requirements provided for in this Directive shall apply neither to undertakings which are subject to the requirements of Articles 13a and 13b of Directive 2002/21/EC, nor to trust service providers which are subject to the requirements of Article 19 of Regulation 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.



4. This Directive shall be without prejudice to Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems, Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography and Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.
5. This Directive shall be without prejudice to Directive 95/46/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
- 6a. Without prejudice to Article 346 TFEU, information that is confidential pursuant to Union and national rules, such as rules on business confidentiality, shall be exchanged with the Commission and other competent authorities only where such exchange is necessary for the application of this Directive. The exchanged information shall be limited to that which is relevant and proportionate to the purpose of such exchange. Such exchange of information shall preserve the confidentiality of that information as well as the security and commercial interests of operators of essential services and digital service providers.
- 6b. This Directive is without prejudice to the actions taken by Member States to safeguard their essential State functions, in particular to safeguard national security (including actions protecting information, the disclosure of which Member States consider contrary to the essential interests of their security), and to maintain law and order, in particular to permit the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences.
7. Where a sector specific Union legal act requires operators of essential services or digital service providers to ensure either the security of their networks and information systems or the notification of incidents, provided that such requirements are at least equivalent in effect to the obligations contained in this Directive, those provisions of that sector specific Union legal act shall apply instead the corresponding provisions of this Directive.

### *Article 1a*

#### Protection and processing of personal data

1. Processing of personal data pursuant to this Directive shall be carried out in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC.
2. Processing of personal data by Union institutions and bodies pursuant to this Directive shall be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.

### *Article 1b*

#### **Voluntary notification**

**Without prejudice to Article 2, entities which have not been identified as operators of essential services and are not digital service providers may notify incidents having a significant impact on the continuity of the services they provide on a voluntary basis.**

**When processing notifications, Member States shall act in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 14. Member States may process mandatory notifications in priority to voluntary notifications. Voluntary notifications shall only be processed where such processing does not constitute a disproportionate or undue burden on Member States concerned.**

**Voluntary notification shall not result in the imposition upon the notifying entity of any obligations to which it would not have been subject had it not given that notification.**

## Article 2

### Minimum harmonisation

**Without prejudice to Article 15a(1b) and to their obligations under Union law**, Member States shall not be prevented from adopting or maintaining provisions with a view to achieving a higher level of security of networks and information systems, ~~without prejudice to their obligations under Union law, unless otherwise provided for in this Directive.~~

## Article 3

### Definitions

For the purpose of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:

- (1) "network and information system" means:
  - (a) an electronic communications network within the meaning of point (a) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC, and
  - (b) any device or group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, perform automatic processing of digital data, as well as
  - (c) digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by elements covered under point (a) and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and maintenance.
- (2) "security of networks and information systems" means the ability of networks and information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related services offered by or accessible via that network and information systems;
- (3) "risk" means any reasonably identifiable circumstance or event having a potential adverse effect on the security of networks and information systems;
- (4) "incident" means any event having an actual adverse effect on the security of networks and information systems;
- (6a) "National strategy on the security of networks and informations systems ("NIS strategy")" means a framework providing strategic objectives and priorities on NIS at national level;
- (7) "incident handling" means all procedures supporting the **detection**, analysis, containment and response to an incident;

- (8) "operator of essential services" means a public or private entity the type of which is referred to in Annex II, which meets the criteria laid down in Article 3a(1a);
- ~~(8a) 'digital service provider' means any legal person that provides an information society service within the meaning of point (2) of Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC offered to the public at large or to businesses at large, and the type of which is listed in Annex III.~~
- (9) "standard" means a standard within the meaning of point (1) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012;
- (10) "specification" means a technical specification within the meaning of point (4) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012;
- (11d) 'digital service provider' means any legal person that provides an information society a service within the meaning of point 2 (b) of Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC 2015/1535 offered to the public at large or to businesses at large which is of a type listed in Annex III.**
- (11 da) 'digital service provider' means any legal person that provides a digital service.**
- (11e) 'Online marketplace' is a digital service that allows consumers and/or traders as defined respectively in Article 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) of Directive 2013/11/EU to conclude online sales and service contracts with traders either on the online marketplace's website or on a trader's website that uses computing services provided by the online marketplace.**
- (11g) 'Online search engine' is a digital service that allows users to perform searches of in principle all websites or a geographical subset thereof, websites in a particular language on the basis of a query on any subject in the form of a keyword, phrase or other input; and returns links in which information related to the requested content can be found.**
- (11j) 'Cloud computing service' is a digital service that enables access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources.**
- (11k) "representative" means any natural or legal person established in the Union explicitly designated to act on behalf of a digital services provider not established in the Union, which may be addressed by the competent authority or CSIRT instead of the digital service provider, with regard to the obligations of the digital service provider under this Directive.
- (11l) "Internet Exchange Point (IXP)" means a network facility that enables the interconnection of more than two independent autonomous systems, primarily for the purpose of facilitating the exchange of Internet traffic. An IXP provides interconnection only for autonomous systems. An IXP does not require the Internet traffic passing between any pair of participating autonomous systems to pass through any third autonomous system, nor does it alter or otherwise interfere with such traffic.

- (11m) "Domain Name System service provider" means an entity which provides DNS services on the internet (DNS is a hierarchical distributed naming system in a network which refers queries for domain names).
- (11n) "Top-level domain name registry" means an entity which administers and operates the registration of internet domain names under a specific Top-level domain (TLD).

*Article 3a*

Identification of operators of essential services

1. **By (6 months after the date referred to in article 21(1)), ~~F~~for each subsector referred to in Annex II, Member States shall identify the operators of essential services **with an establishment** on their territory.**
  - 1a. The criteria referred to in Article 3(8) shall be as follows:
    - (a) an entity provides a service which is essential for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities;
    - (b) the provision of that service depends on network and information systems; and
    - (c) an incident to the network and information systems of that service would have significant disruptive effects on its provision.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, each Member State shall establish a list of the services referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1a.
3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, where an entity provides a service referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1a in two or more Member States, those Member States shall engage in consultation with each other. That consultation shall take place before a decision on identification is taken.
4. Member States shall on a regular basis, and at least every two years after the date referred to in Article 21(1), review and, where appropriate, update the list of identified operators of essential services.
5. The role of the Cooperation Group shall be, in accordance with the tasks referred to in Article 8a, to support Member States to take a consistent approach in the process of identification of operators of essential services.
6. For the purpose of the review referred to in Article 20 and by six months after the date of transposition, and every two years thereafter, Member States shall submit to the Commission the information necessary for the Commission to assess the implementation of this Directive, in particular the consistency of Member States' approaches to the identification of operators of essential services. That information shall include at least:

- (a) national measures allowing for the identification of operators of essential services;
- (b) the list of services referred to in paragraph 2;
- (c) the number of operators of essential services identified for each sector referred to in Annex II and an indication of their importance in relation to that sector;
- (d) thresholds, where they exist, to determine the relevant supply level in accordance with the number of users relying on that service in accordance with point (a) of Article 3b or the importance of that particular operator of essential services in accordance with point (f) of Article 3b.

In order to contribute to the provision of comparable information, the Commission, taking the utmost account of the opinion of ENISA, may adopt appropriate technical guidelines on parameters for the information referred to in this paragraph.

#### *Article 3b*

##### Significant disruptive effect

1. When determining the significance of a disruptive effect referred to in point (c) of Article 3a(1a), Member States shall take into account at least the following cross-sectoral factors:
  - (a) the number of users relying on the services provided by the entity;
  - (b) the ~~direct~~ dependency of other sectors referred to in Annex II on the service provided by the entity;
  - (c) the impact that incidents could have, in terms of degree and duration, on economic and societal activities or public safety;
  - (d) the market share of the entity;
  - (e) the geographic spread with regard to the area that could be affected by an incident;
  - (f) the importance of the entity for maintaining a sufficient level of the service, taking into account the availability of alternatives for the provision of that service.
2. In order to determine whether an incident would have a significant disruptive effect, Member States shall also take into account sector-specific factors where appropriate.

**CHAPTER II**  
**NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS ON NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY**

*Article 4*

Principle

deleted

*Article 5*

National NIS strategy

1. Each Member State shall adopt a national NIS strategy defining the strategic objectives and appropriate policy and regulatory measures with a view to achieving and maintaining a high level of security of networks and information systems and covering at least the sectors referred to in Annex II and the services referred to in Annex III. The national NIS strategy shall address in particular the following issues:
  - (a) The objectives and priorities of the national NIS strategy;
  - (b) A governance framework to achieve the objectives and priorities of the national NIS strategy, including roles and responsibilities of the government bodies and the other relevant actors;
  - (c) The identification of measures on preparedness, response and recovery, including cooperation between the public and private sectors;
  - (d) An indication of the education, awareness raising and training programmes relating to the NIS strategy;
  - (e) An indication of the research and development plans relating to the NIS strategy;
  - (f) A risk assessment plan to identify possible risks;
  - (g) A list of the various actors involved in the implementation of the NIS strategy;

- 2a. Member States may request the assistance of ENISA in developing national NIS strategies.
3. The national NIS strategy shall be communicated to the Commission within three months from its adoption. In so doing, Member States may exclude elements of the strategy related to national security.

### *Article 6*

#### National competent authorities and single point of contact

1. Each Member State shall designate one or more national competent authorities on the security of network and information systems (the "competent authority") covering at least the sectors referred to in Annex II and the digital services referred to in Annex III. Member States may designate this role to an existing authority or authorities.
2. The competent authorities shall monitor the application of this Directive at national level.
- 2a. Each Member State shall designate a national single point of contact on the security of networks and information systems ("single point of contact"). Member States may designate this role to an existing authority. Where a Member State designates only one competent authority, that competent authority shall also be the single point of contact.
- 2c. The single point of contact shall exercise a liaison function to ensure cross-border cooperation of Member State authorities and with the relevant authorities in other Member States and with the cooperation group and the CSIRTs network.
3. Member States shall ensure that the designated competent authorities and the single points of contact have adequate resources to carry out in an effective and efficient manner the tasks assigned to them and thereby to fulfil the objectives of this Directive. Member States shall ensure effective, efficient and secure cooperation of the designated representatives in the cooperation group referred to in Article 8a.
4. Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities or CSIRTs receive ~~the incident notifications of incidents as specified under Article 14(2), 14(2a) and 15a(2)~~ **submitted pursuant to this Directive.**



- 4a(new) In order to enable the single points of contact to submit a summary report on notifications to the Cooperation Group, Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities or CSIRTs inform the single points of contact about **incident** notifications ~~of incidents under Article 14(2), 14(2ac) and 15a(2)~~ **submitted pursuant to this Directive**.
- 4ab(new) Once a year, the single point of contact shall submit a summary report to the cooperation group on the notifications received, including the number of notifications and the nature of notified incidents, and the action taken in accordance with article 14(2), 14(2ac) and 15a(2).
5. The competent authorities and single point of contact shall, whenever appropriate and in accordance with national law, consult and cooperate, ~~whenever appropriate~~, with the relevant national law enforcement authorities and national data protection authorities.
6. Each Member State shall notify to the Commission without delay the designation of the competent authority and single point of contact, their tasks, and any subsequent change thereto. Each Member State shall make public its designation of the competent authority and single point of contact. The Commission shall publish the list of designated single points of contacts.

## *Article 7*

### Computer Security Incident Response Teams

1. Each Member State shall designate one or more Computer Security Incident Response Teams (hereinafter: "CSIRTs ") covering at least the sectors referred to in Annex II and types of digital services ~~providers~~ referred to in Annex III, responsible for handling incidents and risks according to a well-defined process, which shall comply with the requirements set out in point (1) of Annex I. A CSIRT may be established within a competent authority.
- 1a. Where they are separate, the competent authority, the single point of contact and the CSIRTs of the same Member State shall cooperate with regard to the obligations laid down in this Directive. Where a Member State decides that CSIRTs shall not receive notifications, the CSIRTs shall, to the extent necessary to fulfil their tasks, be granted access to data on incidents notified by operators of essential services pursuant to Article 14(2) and (2ac) or by digital service providers pursuant to Article 15a(2).
2. Member States shall ensure that the designated CSIRTs have adequate resources to effectively carry out their tasks set out in point (2) of Annex I.

Member States shall ensure the effective, efficient and secure cooperation of their CSIRTs in the CSIRT network referred to in Article 8b.

3. Member States shall ensure that the designated CSIRTs have access to an appropriate, secure, and resilient communication and information infrastructure at national level.
4. Member States shall inform the Commission about the remit as well as the main elements of the incident handling process of the CSIRTs.
- 5c. Member States may request the assistance of ENISA in developing national CSIRTs.

### CHAPTER III

#### *COOPERATION BETWEEN COMPETENT AUTHORITIES*

##### *Article 8*

##### Cooperation network

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##### *Article 8a*

##### Cooperation group

1. In order to support and facilitate strategic cooperation among Member States, to develop trust and confidence and with a view to achieving a high common level of security of networks and information systems in the Union, a cooperation group is hereby established.

The cooperation group shall carry out its tasks on the basis of biennial work programmes as referred to in Article 8a(3a new).

2. The cooperation group shall be composed of representatives from the Member States, the Commission and the European Network and Information Security Agency (“ENISA”).

The Commission shall provide the secretariat.

Where appropriate, the cooperation group may invite representatives from the relevant stakeholders to participate in its work.

3. The cooperation group shall have the following tasks:
- a. By 18 months after entry into force and every two years thereafter, establish a work programme on actions to be undertaken to implement the objectives and tasks, which shall be consistent with the objectives of this Directive.
  - b. Provide strategic guidance for the activities of the CSIRTs network established under Article 8b.
  - c. Exchange best practice on the exchange of information related to incident notification referred to in Article 14(2ac) and 15a(2).
  - d. Exchange best practices between Member States and, in collaboration with ENISA, assist Member States in building capacity in NIS;
  - e. Discuss capabilities and preparedness of the Member States, and, on a voluntary basis, evaluate national NIS strategies and the effectiveness of CSIRTs, and identify best practices.
  - f. Exchange information and best practice on awareness raising and training.
  - g. Exchange information and best practice on research and development on network and information security.
  - h. Where relevant, exchange experiences on matters concerning NIS with relevant Union **institutions** bodies, offices and agencies.
  - i. Discuss, with representatives from the relevant European Standardisation Organisations, the standards referred to in Article 16.
  - j. Collect best practice information on risks and incidents affecting network and information systems;
  - k. Examine on an annual basis the summary reports referred to in Article 6(4ab new).
  - l. Discuss the work undertaken with regard to NIS exercises, education programmes and training, including the work by ENISA.
  - m. With ENISA's assistance, exchange best practices with regard to the identification of operators of essential services by the Member States, including in relation to cross-border dependencies regarding NIS risks and incidents.
  - n. Discuss modalities for reporting notifications of incidents referred to in Article 14 and 15a.

4. As input to the Commission's periodic review of the functioning of this Directive, the cooperation group shall every one and a half years produce a report assessing the experience gained with the strategic cooperation pursued under this Article.
5. ~~By [6 months after entry into force]~~ The Commission, ~~taking the views of ENISA into account,~~ shall establish by means of implementing acts, procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning of the Cooperation Group. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 19(3). **For the purposes of the first subparagraph, the Commission shall submit the first draft implementing act to the Committee by 6 months after entry into force.**

### *Article 8b*

#### CSIRTs network

1. In order to contribute to developing confidence and trust between the Member States and to promote swift and effective operational cooperation, a network of the national CSIRTs is hereby established.
2. The CSIRTs network shall be composed of representatives of the Member States' CSIRTs and CERT-EU. The Commission shall participate in the CSIRTs network as an observer. The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) shall provide the secretariat and actively support the cooperation among the CSIRTs.
3. The CSIRTs network shall have the following tasks:
  - a. Exchange information on CSIRTs services, operations and cooperation capabilities.
  - b. At the request of the representative of a Member State potentially affected by an incident, exchange and discuss non-commercially sensitive information related to that incident and associated risks. Any Member State may refuse to contribute to that discussion if there is a risk of prejudice to the investigation of the incident.
  - c. Exchange and make available on a voluntary basis non-confidential information on individual incidents.
  - d. At the request of the representative of a Member State's CSIRT, discuss and, where possible, identify a coordinated response to an incident that has been identified within the jurisdiction of that same Member State.

- e. Support Member States in addressing cross-border incidents on the basis of their voluntary mutual assistance.
  - f. Discuss, explore and identify further forms of operational cooperation, including in relation to:
    - (i) categories of risks and incidents
    - (ii) early warnings
    - (iii) mutual assistance
    - (iv) principles and modalities for coordination, when Member States respond to cross border NIS risks and incidents.
  - g. Inform the Cooperation Group on its activities and on the further forms of operational cooperation discussed pursuant to paragraph 3(f), and request guidance related thereto.
  - h. Discuss lessons learnt from NIS exercises, including from those organised by ENISA.
  - i. At the request of an individual CSIRT, discuss the capabilities and preparedness of that same CSIRT.
  - j. Issue guidelines in order to facilitate the convergence of (operational) practices with regard to the application of the provisions of this Article concerning operational cooperation.
4. As input to the Commission's periodic review of the functioning of this Directive, the CSIRTs network shall every one and a half years produce a report assessing the experience gained with the operational cooperation, including conclusions and recommendations, pursued under this article. That report shall also be submitted to the cooperation group.
5. The CSIRTs network shall define its own rules of procedure.

#### *Article 9*

#### Secure information-sharing system

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*Article 10*  
Early warnings

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*Article 11*  
Coordinated response

deleted

*Article 12*  
Union NIS cooperation plan

deleted

*Article 13*  
International cooperation

The Union may conclude international agreements in accordance with Article 218 TFEU with third countries or international organisations allowing and organizing their participation in some activities of the cooperation group. Such agreement shall take into account the need to ensure adequate protection of sensitive data ~~including personal data circulating within the cooperation group~~.

## CHAPTER IV

### SECURITY OF THE NETWORKS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS OF OPERATORS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

#### *Article 14*

##### Security requirements and incident notification

1. Member States shall ensure that operators of essential services take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of networks and information systems which they use in their operations. Having regard to the state of the art, those measures shall ensure a level of security of networks and information systems appropriate to the risk presented.
- 1a Member States shall ensure that operators of essential services take appropriate measures to prevent and minimise the impact of incidents affecting the security of the networks and information systems used for the provision of such essential services ~~and thus striving to maintain~~ **with a view to ensuring** the continuity of those services.
2. Member States shall ensure that operators of essential services notify without undue delay to the competent authority or to the CSIRT incidents having a significant impact on the continuity of the essential services they provide. Notifications shall include ~~relevant~~ information ~~allowing to enable~~ the competent authority or the CSIRT to determine **any the** cross-border ~~effect~~ **impact** of the incident. Notification shall not expose the notifying party to increased liability.
- 2a. To determine the significance of the impact of an incident, the following parameters in particular shall be taken into account:
  - (a) the number of users affected by the disruption of the essential service;
  - (b) the duration of the incident;
  - (c) the geographical spread with regard to the area affected by the incident.
- 2ac. Based on the information provided by the operator of essential services, the notified competent authority or CSIRT shall inform the other affected Member State(s) if the incident has a significant impact on the continuity of essential services in that Member State. In doing so, the competent authority or CSIRT shall, in accordance with Union law or national legislation that complies with Union law, preserve the operator's security and commercial interests as well as the confidentiality of the information provided by the operator.

Where the circumstances allow for it, the competent authority or CSIRT shall provide the notifying operator of essential services with relevant information with regards to the follow-up of the notification of an incident, such as information that could support the effective handling of the incident.

At the request of the competent authority or CSIRTs, the single point of contact shall forward notifications referred to in the first subparagraph to single points of contact in other affected Member States.

~~2c Without prejudice to Article 2, entities which have not been identified as operators of essential services may notify incidents having a significant impact on the continuity of the services they provide on a voluntary basis.~~

~~When processing notifications, Member States shall act in accordance with the procedure set out in this Article.~~

~~Member States may process mandatory notifications in priority to voluntary notifications. Voluntary notifications shall only be processed where such processing does not constitute a disproportionate or undue burden on Member States.~~

~~Voluntary notification shall not result in the imposition upon the notifying entity of any obligations to which it would not have been subject had it not given that notification.~~

4. After consulting the operator of essential services concerned, the notified competent authority or CSIRT may inform the public, ~~or require the operators of essential services to do so,~~ about individual incidents, where public awareness is necessary to prevent an incident or deal with an ongoing incident.
6. ~~The Member States, after discussion in the cooperation group in accordance with point (n) of Article 8a(3), may adopt guidelines concerning the circumstances in which operators of essential services are required to notify incidents, including on the parameters to determine the significance of the impact of an incident as referred to in paragraph 2a. These guidelines shall take utmost account of the outcome of the discussions within the cooperation group.~~ **Competent authorities acting together within the cooperation group may develop and adopt guidelines concerning the circumstances in which operators of essential services are required to notify incidents, including on the parameters to determine the significance of the impact of an incident as referred to in paragraph 2a.**



## *Article 15*

### Implementation and enforcement

1. Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities have the necessary powers and means to assess the compliance of operators of essential services with their obligations under Article 14 and the effects thereof on the security of networks and information systems.
2. Member States shall ensure that the competent authority has the powers and means to require operators of essential services to:
  - (a) provide information needed to assess the security of their networks and information systems, including documented security policies;
  - (b) provide evidence of effective implementation of security policies, such as the results of a security audit carried out by the competent authority or a qualified auditor and, in the latter case, make the results thereof, including the underlying evidence, available to the competent authority.

When sending that request, the competent authorities shall state the purpose of the request and specify what information is required.

3. Following the assessment of information or results of security audits referred to in paragraph 2, the competent authority may issue binding instructions to the operators of essential services to remedy their operations.
5. The competent authority shall work in close cooperation with personal data protection authorities when addressing incidents resulting in personal data breaches.

## CHAPTER IVa

### SECURITY OF THE NETWORKS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS OF DIGITAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

#### Article 15a

##### Security requirements and incident notification

1. Member States shall ensure that digital service providers identify and take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of networks and information systems which they use in the context of offering services referred to in Annex III within the Union. Having regard to the state of the art, those measures shall ensure a level of security of network and information systems appropriate to the risk presented **and shall take into account the following elements:**
  - security of systems and facilities,
  - incident management,
  - business continuity management,
  - monitoring, auditing and testing,
  - compliance with international standards.
- 1a. In particular, measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of incidents affecting the security of the digital service provider's networks and information systems on the services referred to in Annex III that are offered within the Union, ~~thus striving to maintain~~ **with a view to ensuring** the continuity of those services.
- 1b. **Member States shall not impose any further security or notification requirements on digital service providers without prejudice to Article 1(6b).**
2. Member States shall ensure that digital service providers notify any incident having a substantial impact on the provision of a service as referred to in Annex III that they offer within the Union to the competent authority or to the CSIRT without undue delay. Notifications shall include information to enable the competent authority or CSIRT to determine the significance of any cross-border impact. Notification shall not expose the notifying party to increased liability.

~~2a. An incident shall be considered as having a substantial impact on the provision of the service where the following criteria are fulfilled:~~

**To determine the impact of an incident, the following parameters shall be taken into account, in particular:**

**(a) the number of users affected by the incident, in particular users relying on the service for the provision of their own services;**

**(b) the duration of the incident;**

**(c) the geographical spread with regard to the area affected by the incident;**

**(d) the extent of the disruption of the functioning of the service is seriously disrupted;**

~~(b) a high number of users are affected by the disruption of the service, in particular users relying on the service for the provision of their own services ;~~

**(e) the extent of the impact on economic and societal activities is profound.**

The obligation to notify an incident shall only apply where the digital service provider has access to the information required to appreciate if the criteria are fulfilled.

2b. Where an operator of essential services relies on a third-party ~~cloud computing service to provide~~ **digital service provider for the provision of** a service which is essential for the maintenance of critical societal and economic activities, ~~the contract may include a requirement that the cloud computing service provider notifies incidents solely to the operator of essential services. In such a case, Article 14(2) shall apply and the digital service provider shall not be obliged to notify the incident in addition to the competent authority or CSIRT.~~ **any significant impact on the continuity of the essential services due to an incident affecting the digital service provider shall be notified by the operator of essential services.**

3. Where appropriate, in particular if the incident referred to in paragraph 2 concerns two or more Member States, the notified competent authority or the CSIRT shall inform other affected Member States. In doing so, the competent authorities, CSIRTs and single points of contact shall, in accordance with Union law or national legislation that complies with Union law, preserve the digital service provider's security and commercial interests as well as the confidentiality of the information provided.
- ~~3a.~~ After consulting the digital service provider concerned, the notified competent authority or CSIRT, and, where appropriate, the authorities or CSIRTs of other Member States concerned may inform the public **about individual incidents** or require the digital service provider to do so, where ~~it determines that~~ **public awareness is necessary to prevent an incident or deal with an ongoing incident, or where** disclosure of the incident is **otherwise** in the public interest.
4. ~~ENISA shall publish guidelines concerning the measures referred to in paragraph 1 and the notifications referred to in paragraph 2.~~
- The Commission shall be empowered to adopt implementing acts in accordance with Article 19(3) further specifying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Those implementing acts shall be adopted by [1 year after entry into force].**
- 4a. **The Commission shall be empowered to adopt implementing acts in accordance with Article 19(3) specifying the parameters listed in paragraph 2. Those implementing acts shall be adopted by [1 year after entry into force].**
- 4b. **The Commission may by means of implementing acts adopt the formats and procedures applicable to notification requirements. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 19(3).**
5. This ~~article~~ **Chapter** shall not apply to micro- and small enterprises as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.

### *Article 15b/c*

#### Implementation and enforcement

1. Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities take action, if necessary, through ex post supervisory activities, when provided with evidence that a digital service provider does not meet the requirements laid down in Article 15a. Such evidence may be submitted by a competent authority of another Member State where the service is provided.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall have the necessary powers and means to:
  - (a) require digital service providers to provide information needed to assess the security of their networks and information systems including documented security policies
  - (b) require that digital service providers remedy any failure to fulfil the requirements laid down in article 15a.
3. If a digital service provider has its main establishment or a representative in one Member State, but its networks and information systems are located in one or more other Member States, the competent authority of the Member State of the main establishment or of the representative and the competent authorities of these other Member States shall cooperate and assist each other as necessary. Such assistance and cooperation may cover information exchanges between competent authorities concerned and requests to carry out the supervisory measures referred to in paragraph 2.

### *Article 15c/d*

#### Jurisdiction and territoriality

1. For the purposes of this Directive, a digital service provider shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction of the Member State where it has its main establishment. A digital service provider shall be deemed to have its main establishment in a Member State when it has its head office in the Union in that Member State.
2. A digital service provider that is not established in the Union, but offers services as referred to in Annex III within the Union, shall designate a representative in the Union. The representative shall be established in one of those Member States where the services are offered. The digital service provider shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction of the Member State where the representative is established.
4. The designation of a representative by the digital service provider shall be without prejudice to legal actions which could be initiated against the digital service provider itself.

**CHAPTER IVb**  
**STANDARDISATION**

*Article 16*

Standardisation

1. To promote convergent implementation of Article 14(1), 14(1a), 15a(1) and 15a(1a) Member States shall, without imposing or discriminating in favour of the use of a particular type of technology, encourage the use of European or internationally accepted standards and/or specifications relevant to **security of networks and information systems security**.
- 1a. The European Network and Information Security Agency ("ENISA"), in collaboration with Member States, shall elaborate advice and guidelines regarding the technical areas which should be considered in relation to paragraph 1 as well as regarding already existing standards, including Member States' national standards, which would allow for covering these areas.

**CHAPTER V**  
**FINAL PROVISIONS**

*Article 17*

Penalties

1. Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall notify, by [date of transposition of this Directive], the Commission of those rules and of those measures and shall notify it, without delay, of any subsequent amendment affecting them.

### *Article 18*

#### Exercise of the delegation

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### *Article 19*

#### Committee procedure

1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee (the Network and Information Security Committee). That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
- ~~2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.~~
3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

### *Article 20*

#### Review

1. The Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to Council one year after the date of transposition, assessing the consistency of the approach taken by Member States in the identification of the operators of essential services.
2. The Commission shall periodically review the functioning of this Directive and report to the European Parliament and to the Council. For this purpose and with a view to further **advancing** the strategic and operational cooperation, the Commission shall take into account the reports of the Cooperation Group and CSIRT network on the experience gained at a strategic and operational level. In its review the Commission shall also assess the list contained in Annex II and III, and the consistency in the identification of operators of essential services and services in the sectors referred to in Annex II. The first report shall be submitted no later than three years after the date referred to in Article 21(1).

## Article 20a

### Transitional measures

1. Without prejudice to Article 21 and with a view of providing Member States with additional possibilities for appropriate cooperation during the period of transposition, the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs Network shall begin to perform their tasks set out respectively in Articles 8a(3) and 8b(3) by 6 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive.
  - 1a. In the period between the dates set out in paragraph 1 and in article **3a(1) 21(13a)**, and for the purposes of supporting Member States to take a consistent approach in the process of identification of operators of essential services, the Cooperation Group shall discuss the process, substance and the type of national measures and, ~~at the request of a Member State, draft national measures of that Member State,~~ allowing for the identification of operators of essential services within a specific sector in accordance with the criteria set out in Articles 3a and 3b. **The Cooperation Group shall also discuss, at the request of a Member State, specific draft national measures of that Member State, allowing for the identification of operators of essential services within a specific sector in accordance with the criteria set out in Articles 3a and 3b.**
2. By 6 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive and for the purposes of this Article, Member States shall ensure appropriate representation in the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs Network.

## Article 21

### Transposition

1. Member States shall adopt and publish, by ~~two years~~ **21 months** after the date of entry into force of this Directive at the latest, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of such provisions.
2. **They shall apply those measures from one day after the date referred to in paragraph 1.**
3. When Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.
- 3a. ~~Member States shall carry out an initial identification of operators of essential services in accordance with Article 3a by two and half years 27 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive.~~



4. **Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.**

*Article 22*

Entry into force

This Directive shall enter into force on the [twentieth] day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

*Article 23*

Addressees

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

## **Requirements and tasks of the Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)**

The requirements and tasks of the CSIRT shall be adequately and clearly defined and supported by national policy and/or regulation. They shall include the following elements:

### (1) Requirements for the CSIRT

(a) The CSIRTs shall ensure high availability of its communications services by avoiding single points of failure and have several means for being contacted and for contacting others at all times. Furthermore, the communication channels shall be clearly specified and well known to the constituency and cooperative partners.

(c) The offices of the CSIRT and the supporting information systems shall be located in secure sites.

### (e) Business continuity:

- The CSIRT shall be equipped with an appropriate system for managing and routing requests, in order to facilitate handovers,
- The CSIRT shall be adequately staffed to ensure availability at all times,
- The CSIRT shall rely on an infrastructure whose continuity is ensured. To this end, redundant systems and backup working space shall be available.

(f) CSIRTS shall have the possibility to participate, where appropriate, in international cooperation networks

### (2) Tasks of the CSIRT

#### (a) Tasks of the CSIRT shall include at least the following:

- Monitoring incidents at a national level,
- Providing early warning, alerts, announcements and dissemination of information to relevant stakeholders about risks and incidents,

- Responding to incidents,
  - Providing dynamic risk and incident analysis and situational awareness,
  - Participating in the CSIRT network
- (b) The CSIRT shall establish cooperative relationships with private sector.
- (c) To facilitate cooperation, the CSIRT shall promote the adoption and use of common or standardised practises for:
- incident and risk handling procedures,
  - incident, risk and information classification schemes.

Sector	Subsector	Type of entity for the purposes of Article 3(8)
1. Energy	<i>a) Electricity</i>	- Electricity undertaking as defined in Article 2(35) of Directive 2009/72/EC, which carries out the function of "supply" as defined in Article 2(19) of Directive 2009/72/EC
		- Distribution system operators as defined in Article 2(6) of Directive 2009/72/EC
		- Transmission system operators as defined in Article 2(4) of Directive 2009/72/EC
	<i>b) Oil</i>	- Operator of oil transmission pipelines
		- Operators of oil production, refining and treatment facilities, storage and transmission
	<i>c) Gas</i>	- Supply undertakings as defined in Article 2(8) of Directive 2009/73/EC
		- Distribution system operators as defined in Article 2(6) of Directive 2009/73/EC
		- Transmission system operators as defined in Article 2(4) of Directive 2009/73/EC
		- Storage system operators as defined in Article 2(10) of Directive 2009/73/EC
		- LNG system operator as defined in Article 2(12) of Directive 2009/73/EC
		- Natural gas undertaking as defined in Article 2(1) of Directive 2009/73/EC
		- Operator of natural gas refining and treatment facilities

2. Transport	<i>(a) Air transport</i>	- Air carriers as defined in Article 3(4) of Regulation 300/2008	
		- Airport managing bodies as defined in Article 2(2) of Directive 2009/12/EC managing airports as defined in Article 2(1) of Directive 2009/12/EC, including the core airports listed in section 2 of Annex II of Regulation 1315/2013; and entities operating ancillary installations contained within airports.	
		- Traffic management control operators providing air traffic control (ATC) service as defined in Article 2(1) of Regulation 549/2004	
	<i>(b) Rail transport</i>	- Infrastructure managers as defined in Article 3(2) of Directive 2012/34/EU	
		- Railway undertakings as defined in Article 3(1) of Directive 2012/34/EU, including operators of service facilities as defined in Article 3(12) of Directive 2012/34/EU	
	<i>(c) Water transport</i>	(i) inland, sea and coastal passenger and freight water transport companies, as defined for maritime transport in Annex I of Regulation 725/2004/EC, not including the individual vessels operated by those companies	
		(ii) Managing bodies of ports as defined in Article 3(1) of Directive 2005/65/EC, including their port facilities as defined in Article 2(11) of Regulation (EC) 725/2004; and entities operating works and equipment contained within ports	
		(iii) Operators of vessel traffic services, as defined in Article 3(o) of Directive 2002/59/EC	
		<i>(d) Road Transport</i>	(i) Road authorities as defined in Article 2(12) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/962 responsible for traffic management control
			<b>(ii) Operators of Intelligent Transport Systems as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2010/40/EU</b>

3. Banking		- credit institutions as defined in Article 4 of Regulation 575/2013
4. Financial market infrastructures		- Operators of trading venues as defined in Article 4 of Directive 2014/65/EU
		- Central counterparty as defined in Article 2 of Regulation 648/2012
5. Health sector	Health care settings (including hospitals and private clinics)	- healthcare providers as defined in Article 3(g) of Directive 2011/24/EU
6. Drinking water supply and distribution		Supplier and distributor of "water intended for human consumption" as defined in Article 2(1)(a) of Council Directive 98/83/EC but excluding distributors for whom distribution of water for human consumption is only part of their general activity of distribution of commodities and goods.
7. Digital Infrastructure		Internet exchange points
		Domain name system service providers
		Top Level Domain name registries

**Types of digital services for purposes of Article 3(11d)**1. ~~Online/e-commerce marketplace~~

~~An online marketplace is a digital service that allows consumers and/or traders, as defined respectively in Article 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) of Directive 2013/11/EU, to conclude online sales and service contracts with traders, either on the online marketplace's website or on a trader's website that uses computing services provided by the online marketplace~~

2. ~~Social network~~

~~'A social network' is a digital service dedicated to enable users to exchange, via an individualised profile created on the service, information or content with other users and generate a list of users with whom they are connected.~~

3. ~~Online search engine~~

~~'An online search engine' is a digital service that allows users to perform searches of in principle all websites or a geographical subset thereof, on the basis of a a query on any subject in the form of a keyword, phrase or other input and returns links in which information related to the requested content can be found.~~

4. ~~Cloud computing service~~

~~'A Cloud Computing service' is a digital service that enables access to scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources.~~

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